Leveling the Playing Field: Using Risk Adjustment to Enhance Performance Based Contracting in Residential Treatment



Presentation Overview

What is performance based contracting? Measuring for meaning – what do you want to measure and how do you develop performance indicators? Leveling the playing field for providers what is risk adjustment? How do you set performance benchmarks? Carrots and sticks – what type of fiscal foundation do you need? System reform – what supports do you need to be successful?

What is Performance Based Contracting (PBC)?

Emphasizes <u>results</u> related to output, quality and outcomes rather than how the work is performed

Has <u>clearly defined objectives</u> and timeframes

 Uses <u>measurable performance standards</u> and quality assurance plans
 Provides <u>performance incentives and</u> <u>penalties</u> and ties payment to outcomes

Expectations and Benefits of Performance Based Contracting Encourages innovation and competition Results in both lower costs and improved performance Shifts some risk to contractors so they are responsible for achieving outcomes Encourages governmental entities and contractors to work together to provide the best services to clients Documents results for fiscal accountability

Why are Public Child Welfare **Agencies Interested in PBC?** Promotes achievement of specific departmental outcomes Identifies priority areas and invests resources to maximize client outcomes Sets groundwork to evaluate programs and services Documents results for fiscal accountability Transfers risks (or at least shares it) with the contractor!

Why are Private Agencies Interested in PBC? Increased opportunity for innovation and creativity Ability to engage in full partnership with government Reinvestment of savings into improved services for clients Potential for less frequent, but more meaningful contract monitoring

Challenges of PBC


What outcomes are you measuring? What baseline data are you relying on? How reliable is the data? How do you define your outcomes? Should the public agency "punish" contractors for legitimate effort that falls short of the goals set? How do you manage other systems impacting your performance?

Striving for Excellence Can PBC Make a Difference In Residential Care?

Expands Illinois' PBC to residential treatment, Independent Living and Transitional Living Programs

Grant from the National Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare Services to document and evaluate how it is done

Residential Treatment:




Child Welfare Challenges/Trends --Serving Youth with More Complex Needs

- Placement change rate high and steadily increasing
- Behavior problems, prior institutionalization and runaway incidents increase subsequent placement instability


Youth with multiple placement disruptions, longer stays in out-of-home care and the lack of a permanent home before entering foster care

Chapin Hall Center for Children

Youth in Residential Treatment Illinois Trends



Youth in Out-of-State Residential Placements Illinois Trends



Implications of Reforms

Fewer youth, but greater proportion referred to residential care with histories reflecting severe psychiatric and behavioral problems

High o extraordina



on of nging youth

Average Number of Adverse Events at Entry to Residential Care



Runaway — Psych hospitalization — — Juvenile detention

Challenges of Serving Youth with More Complex Needs Discharge Outcomes

 Children discharged from residential care are less likely than those not placed in residential care to remain in their new placement postdischarge

 Very high percentage of youth discharged from their first residential care setting to a less restrictive setting during the years 1995-2003 were eventually returned to higher levels of care

Chapin Hall Center for Children

Illinois Residential Discharge Rates FY 04 – FY 06



Total Discharges: 3,448

"Negative" Discharges: 2,069 - 60%

"Positive" Discharges: 1,379 - 40%

Sustained Progress:

Of all youth positively discharged, 854 or 60% (25% of all discharges) were in the same less restrictive placement 6 months post-discharge.

The PBC Challenge

Director's mandate

- emphasis on quality and outcomes rather than capacity and cost
- broad discretion around indicators & process

First steps

- How??
- Who??

Striving for Excellence Organizational Structure

Data Test Workgroup

Critical PBC Functions

Provide input regarding methodology & approach
 Regularly "vet" & review data with critical eye – i.e., test for face validity
 Serve as rudder & gyroscope

...and

Collaboration between DCFS, residential providers and universities – an essential component

Step 1: Developing PBC Goals for Residential Treatment



Developing PBC Goals for Residential Treatment Goal 1: Improve safety/stability during residential treatment

Goal 2: Reduce severity of symptoms and increase functional skills *effectively* and *efficiently*

Goal 3: Improve outcomes at and following discharge from treatment

Derived Performance Indicators from Goals

Step 2: Identifying Measurable Performance Indicators Criteria

Meaningfully address each goal
Utilize currently available data
Utilize reasonably reliable data
Unusual Incident v. Payment Data
Use of standardized outcome measure

Goal 1: Improve Safety/Stability During Treatment

Goal 2: Effectively and Efficiently Reduce Symptoms/ Increase Functionality Goal 3: Improve Outcomes At And Following Discharge

Indicator: * Treatment Opportunity Days Rate (Original) Indicators: Immediate Discharge Disposition Sustained Positive Discharge Length of Stay

* Sustained Fa

Jischarge Rate

Residential Performance Indicators

Treatment Opportunities Days Rate (TODR)

Sustained Favorable Discharge Rate (SFDR)

Performance Indicators Treatment Opportunity Days Rate Percentage of time in treatment during residential stay, i.e.

- at the facility
- not on runaway, in detention, or psychiatric hospital



Calculation is # of days at facility / total # days in residential stay

Treatment Opportunity Days Rate: 3285 / 3650 = 90%


Performance Indicators Sustained Favorable Discharge Rate Discharge Definitions "Favorable" Discharge

- Positive stepdown to less restrictive setting, including residential or group home settings by program classification (within or between agencies)
- Neutral placement in chronic MI setting
- "Sustained"


- Remain in discharge placement 180 days

"Unfavorable" Discharge

Negative - lateral residential/group home move, step up to more restrictive setting, disruption from placement via runaway, hospital, detention/DOC Performance Indicators Sustained Favorable Discharge Rate Percentage of total annual residential spells resulting in sustained favorable discharges



Step 3: Leveling the Playing Field for PBC



Why Risk Adjust Performance?

Each provider serves youth with a different mix of characteristics/risk factors that are related to residential treatment outcomes

Accounting for these differences allows us to fairly measure performance on outcomes across all providers

Leveling the Playing Field

Considered alternative methods – individual improvement benchmarks <u>- benchmarks by classification</u>

Scarce literature regarding RA for mental heath outcomes

Decision to try – ambitious, but most promising approach

What is Risk Adjustment?

A statistical procedure to determine the significance and relative weights of identified risk factors related to performance outcomes

 Risk factors = mostly child and some placement characteristics (e.g. geography)

RA results are then used to calculate each provider's expected performance based on the severity of their case mix, relative to the statewide residential treatment population

Developing the Risk Adjustment Model

- 1. Identified child and placement characteristics that appear to impact performance outcomes
- Tested these via univariate and multivariate regression analysis on DCFS population of youth placed in residential treatment for 3-year period
- Reassessed impact of risk factors in aggregate for consistency with generally accepted clinical profiles of residential programs

Specific Risk Factors Included

Historical child systems involvement

- Juvenile detention or corrections
- Runaway
- Prior placement in residential care
- Aggressive symptoms and antipsychotic use
- Medicaid-paid psychiatric hospitalization

Specific Risk Factors Included

Demographic characteristics

- Age
- Gender
- Child's geographic origin upon entering state custody (Cook, North, Central, South)

Specific Risk Factors Included

Other placement characteristics related to "spell"
- Length of spell (< 1 yr.)</p>

Severity level and/or specialty population served

Levels = severe, moderate, mild
 Institutions and group homes
 Specialties = BD, DD, PP, SBP, YC

 Program's geographic location (Chicago-city, suburban Chicago, exurban Chicago, downstate town, downstate rural)

Risk Factor Examples – Direction of Effect on Outcomes

| Risk Factors | TODR | SFDR |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|
| Historical child systems involvement | | |
| Juvenile detention or corrections | - | - |
| Runaway | | 0 |
| Prior placement in residential care | 0 | - |
| Antipsychotic Rx with aggression | - | - |
| Psychiatric hospitalization | - | - |
| Demographic characteristics | | |
| Female | - | 0 |
| Age | - | + |
| Other placement characteristics | | |
| Length of spell < 365 days | 0 | - |
| Downstate town (vs. Chicago city) | + | + |
| | | |

Risk Adjustment: Calculating Expected Performance

Calculate expected value of TODR and probability of SFD for each child

 Input each child's risk characteristics to the RA model

These expected values are then averaged at the agency level

Limitations of Risk Adjustment

Absence of clinical variables as risk factors

Confounding child variables with provider performance

Imperfect nature of data

Performance thresholds more fair on average, but, there will be winners and losers

Strengths of Risk Adjustment

Levels playing field

Makes PBC feasible where youth are not randomly / systematically assigned to agencies

Reduces incentive to avoid serving difficult youth

Allows for modification as better data become available or as populations change

Supports continued performance improvement

- Current year's thresholds based on (adjusted) average performance
- As PBC incentives increase performance, risk-adjusted performance thresholds will also increase – continuously raising the bar

Step 4: Setting Performance Benchmarks

FY09 Performance benchmarks are based on

- Characteristics of agencies' client population in FY06 and FY07
- Agencies' expected outcomes, given characteristics of resident population, and
- The average of expected outcomes for the 2 years weighted by population size for each year

Setting Performance Benchmarks

| Treatment Opportunit | ty Days Rate | F | FY06 | | | |
|----------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|------------|--------------------|--------------|
| | | program | | actual TOD | risk adjusted TOD | actual minus |
| agency | contract | classification | # spells | rate (%) | rate (%) | RA rate |
| Agency A | 99999999 | severe | 24 | 87.98 | 94.43 | -6.45 |
| FY07 | | | | | | |
| | | program | | actual TOD | risk adjusted TOD | actual minus |
| agency | contract | classification | # spells | rate (%) | rate (%) | RA rate |
| Agency A | 99999999 | severe | 25 | 91.73 | 94.88 | -3.15 |
| | | | | | FY09 Benchmark | |
| | | | | | | avg. TOD |
| | | program | avg. # | avg. TOD | avg. risk adjusted | minus avg. |
| agency | contract | classification | spells | rate (%) | TOD rate (%) | RA rate |
| Agency A | 99999999 | severe | 25 | 89.71 | 94.64 | -4.93 |

Setting Performance Benchmarks

| Sustained Favorable | Discharge Ra | ate I | FY06 | | | | | |
|---------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|------------|------|-----------------------|------|--------------|
| | | program | | actual SFD | # | risk adjusted SFD | # | actual minus |
| agency | contract | classification | # spells | rate (%) | SFDs | rate (%) | SFDs | RA rate (%) |
| Agency A | 99999999 | severe | 24 | 16.67 | 4 | 23.22 | 6 | -6.55 |
| FY07 | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | program | | actual SFD | # | risk adjusted SFD | # | actual minus |
| agency | contract | classification | # spells | rate (%) | SFDs | rate (%) | SFDs | RA rate (%) |
| Agency A | 99999999 | severe | 25 | 20.00 | 5 | 21.85 | 5 | -1.85 |
| | | | | | | FY09 Benchmark | | |
| | | | | | | | | avg. SFD |
| | | program | avg. # | avg. SFD | #* | avg. risk adjusted | #* | minus avg. |
| agency | contract | classification | spells | rate (%) | SFDs | SFD rate (%) | SFDs | RA rate |
| Agency A | 99999999 | severe | 25 | 18.37 | 5 | 22.52 | 6 | -4.15 |

*Estimated; this number is dependent on the actual number of spells accrued during the fiscal year.

Setting Performance Benchmarks

FY09 Performance Benchmarks: All Agencies

Treatment Opportunity Days Rate

| | avg. actual | avg. risk adjusted | difference: actual - |
|---------|-------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | performance | performance | risk adjusted |
| minimum | 76.42 | 88.94 | -16.98 |
| median | 93.25 | 94.76 | -2.21 |
| maximum | 100.00 | 98.00 | 6.08 |

Sustained Favorable Discharge Rate


| avg. actual | avg. risk adjusted | difference: actual - |
|-------------|----------------------------------|--|
| performance | performance | risk adjusted |
| 0 | 4.08 | -32.74 |
| 12.50 | 15.49 | -2.06 |
| 31.82 | 38.59 | 14.50 |
| | performance 0 12.50 | performance performance 0 4.08 12.50 15.49 |

Step 5: Connecting Payment to Performance



Penalties & Rewards

Performance Benchmarks Treatment Opportunity Days Rate Example




Calculation is # of days at facility / total # days in residential stay

Rate of Treatment Opportunity Days: 3285 / 3650 = 90%

If TODR risk adjusted benchmark is 95%: 95% of 3650 = 3468 days 3468 – 3285 = 183 days below benchmark Agency is penalized 25% of per diem payment for 183 days. Example: If per diem is \$300, penalty is \$75 x 183 = \$13,725.

Performance Benchmarks Sustained Favorable Discharge Rate Example Calculating the Bonus



Ex: 10 residential spells, 2 favorable discharges sustained 180 days SFDR = 2/10 or 20% If SFDR benchmark = 20% (2 favorable discharges / 10 residential spells) Agency receives bonus for sustained favorable discharges above benchmark.

Example: If actual SFDR performance = 40% the # of SFDs is 4, or 2 over the benchmark. Performance Benchmarks Sustained Favorable Discharge Rate Example Calculating the Bonus

 Bonus = difference between avg. res'l per diem and avg. stepdown per diem
 applied to average # of days for all SFDs up to 270 days (x 2 in this example).

Example: \$300 - \$150 = \$150.
 for each youth \$150 x 270 days = \$40,500.
 agency total for two youth = \$81,000.

Other PBC Fundamentals

Model rates by program classification
100% guarantee for beds purchased
"No decline" referrals, enhanced matching process, and performance exempt youth

Controversies? Some examples....

Including psych hospitalization rates as part of performance measure

Holding providers responsible for post-discharge outcomes

No decline clause in contract

Underused capacity/empty beds

Systemic Changes to Support PBC

"Drilling" down into the PBC data continues in the Data Test Workgroup

Centralized matching process for admissions

- Transition & Discharge Protocol implemented
- Runaway Assessment & Treatment Planning Process pilot
- Residential-Hospital Networks pilot based on UIC CARTS model
- Residential Treatment Outcomes System (RTOS) reports available to providers to track their outcomes

Lessons Learned from Implementation Communicate, communicate, communicate! Establish a formal structure for public/private partnership Engage university based researchers in your efforts Frequently review and refine your data "Nothing is written in stone...."

Why Should We Care About Measuring Performance?

What gets measured gets done.

If you don't measure results, you can't tell success from failure.

If you can't see success, you can't reward it.

If you can't reward success, you're probably rewarding failure.

If you can't see success, you can't learn from it.
If you can't recognize failure, you can't correct it.
If you can demonstrate results, you can win public support.

From Reinventing Government

Questions & Comments?

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